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MODEST HOPE FOR A MODEST ROBERTS
COURT: DEFERENCE, FACIAL
CHALLENGES, AND THE COMPARATIVE
COMPETENCE OF COURTS
Edward A. Hartnett*

HILE some seem to believe that "ever since Marbury,"' constitutional interpretation has been solely the prerogative of the
judiciary, that notion is wholly untenable. Scholars from across
the political spectrum have brought renewed attention to nonjudicial constitutional interpretation and criticized the Supreme Court for failing to
2
pay sufficient respect to those interpretations.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has found itself in an ever-expanding
morass, trying to sort out the appropriateness of facial, as opposed to asapplied, constitutional challenges. What at one time seemed to be a
clear, general rule, with a narrow First Amendment exception, has devolved into confusion bordering on incoherence across a wide range of
constitutional provisions.
This essay considers these two developments together. It argues that
an exploration of the comparative competence of courts regarding constitutional interpretation should inform the judiciary's approach to facial, as
opposed to as-applied, constitutional challenges. That exploration suggests a modest role for the judiciary and a strong preference for as-applied rather than facial approaches to constitutional adjudication.
Moreover, several early decisions from the Roberts Court suggest that
the Court may be moving toward the more modest role articulated by
Chief Justice John Roberts and associated with as-applied challenges,
while the addition of Justice Samuel Alito to the Court may contribute to
this movement.
* Richard J.Hughes Professor for Constitutional and Public Law and Service, Seton
Hall University School of Law. Thanks to Michelle Adams, John Jacobi, Charles Sullivan,
as well as the participants at a faculty retreat at Seton Hall University School of Law and a
faculty workshop at Hofstra University School of Law for helpful comments.
1. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (claiming that "ever
since Marbury, this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text").
2. Sometimes, however, these scholars "have chosen simply to ignore those holding
similar positions but from different political perspectives, but wishing won't make it so, and
it is important to recognize that contemporary defenders as well as critics of judicial
supremacy exist across the political and ideological spectrum." Frederick Schauer, Judicial
Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1051 (2004).
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NONJUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
AND DEFERENCE

In a detailed series of books, David Currie has demonstrated that the
original understanding of the Constitution was forged in the legislative
and executive branches, and that subsequent litigation seldom involves
new arguments, but rather is usually a rehash of the arguments that first
played out in those branches. 3 Louis Fisher and Neal Devins have similarly shown the important role that Congress and the President have had
in interpreting the Constitution. 4 Those who point to the gaps and ambiguities in the Constitution emphasize the important role of nonjudicial
actors in what Keith Whittington calls "construction" and Richard Fallon
calls "implementing" the Constitution. 5 When asked if he believes in executive constitutional interpretation, John Harrison alludes to baptism by
total immersion: "Believe in it? I've seen it done!"'6 Even the Supreme
Court's widely criticized judicial supremacist decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores acknowledges the power and responsibility of Congress in consti7
tutional interpretation.
Others go further. Michael Paulsen endorses executive review of judgments, that is, the power of the President to refuse to enforce a judgment
that he believes to be based on an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution. 8 Mark Tushnet suggests taking the Constitution away from the
3. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS
AND WHIGS, 1829-1861 (2005); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829-1861 (2005); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1999).
4. Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION Vii (2004);
Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW V (3d ed.
2001).
5. RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION ix (2001); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON,

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSTRUCTION:

DIVIDED

POWERS

AND

CONSTITU-

1 (1999).
6. John Harrison, The Constitution Outside the Supreme Court,4 VA. J. 9, 16 subtext
(2001) (noting that once someone has seen "some very dedicated and sophisticated people" in the executive branch "engaged in trying to figure out what the law requires," it is
"very hard to go back to the easy assumption that the rule of law is just the rule of courts").
7. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) ("When Congress acts within its
sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own
considered judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution ....Were it otherwise,
we would not afford Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy.").
The "ever since Marbury" statement quoted above was itself preceded by an acknowledgment that there is "[n]o doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7. A leading
academic defender of judiciary supremacy in constitutional interpretation similarly notes
that "the Supreme Court (sometimes) defers to the factual, legal, and even constitutional
determinations of Congress." Frederick Schauer, Deferring, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1567, 1567
(2005).
8. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 287 (1994). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2004) (arguing that the
Presidential oath clause "either creates or recognizes a constitutionallaw of necessity and
appears to charge the Presidentwith the primary duty of applying it and judging the degree
of necessity in the press of circumstances").
TIONAL MEANING
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courts. 9 Larry Kramer calls for a renewal of popular constitutionalism.10
Moreover, ever since McCulloch v. Maryland," it has been clear that
judges not only recognize legislative and executive branch interpretation

of the Constitution but also that judges sometimes defer to that constitutional interpretation. The central question in constitutional adjudication
is the degree of deference, if any, that courts
give to constitutional inter12
pretation by other governmental actors.
Complete judicial deference to constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial actors would be the equivalent of eliminating judicial review.
Moreover, to conclude that courts should always work with a strong presumption of constitutionality and always give a large measure of defer-

ence to the constitutional interpretation of others, as Thayer argued at
the end of the nineteenth century was the correct and historically rooted
approach,1 3 would render judicial review a faint echo of contemporary
practice. This approach would not be the end of judicial review, but it
would be the end of judicial review as we have come to know it, particularly in the last half-century. 1 4 Of how many constitutional decisions can
it be said that the law that the judges found unconstitutional was "so obviously repugnant to the Constitution that when pointed out by the
judges, all men of sense and reflection in the community may perceive the

repugnancy?"'15
On the other hand, to conclude that courts should never defer to the
constitutional interpretation of others would empower judges-at least in
a constitutional world with textually open provisions such as "necessary
and proper," "privileges or immunities," "due process," and "equal protection"-to simply run the country as they choose. This would seem to
9. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of JudicialReview: The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 677 (2004) (noting that Tushnet "hedges on his proposal for eliminating all judicial review").
10. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004). See also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT
(1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1348 (2006) (arguing that "judicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode of final
decisionmaking in a free and democratic society").
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-13 (1819).
12. One aspect of this question, not addressed in this essay, is the deference that
judges should give to constitutional interpretation by other judges, in other words, the law
of precedent.
13. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional

Law, 7

HARV.

L.

REV.

129, 135 (1893).

14. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial Activism, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 296 n.11 (1996) ("If democracy is the norm, the view of the
legislature, correctable by the people, should prevail over the view of the judiciary when
the issue is in doubt."). For an argument in favor of an explicitly neo-Thayerian approach
to constitutional adjudication, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).
15. Thayer, supra note 13, at 142. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 53-54 (2005) ("Think of all the landmark Supreme Court
decisions of the past one hundred years, thus including even Lochner .... There probably
isn't a single one that would not have been decided differently but equally plausibly had
the Court been differently but no less ably manned.").
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be where Randy Barnett, with his presumption of liberty, would take
us. 16 This presumption of liberty is a euphemistic equivalent to a presumption of unconstitutionality. Before any law regulating private actors
could be enforced, Barnett would require that judges be convinced that
the law simply regularized rightful behavior or prohibited wrongful behavior-leaving it to judges to "distinguish rightful from wrongful
17
behavior.'
Short of calling for the end of judicial review as we know it or for empowering judges to run the country as they choose, the question becomes
one of sorting. That is, unless one is prepared to endorse either acrossthe-board deference or across-the-board nondeference, it is crucial to ask
when, in what areas, and in what circumstances, courts should defer and
when they should not defer?
Marbury and McCulloch frame the question from the outset. In Marbury, the Court gave no deference at all to the decision of the First Congress to confer original mandamus jurisdiction on the Supreme Court.1 8
In McCulloch, by contrast, the Court deferred to the legislative and executive decision to create a national bank, explaining that the power of
Congress to incorporate a bank "can scarcely be considered as an open
question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation
respecting it."19
In modern constitutional adjudication, this sorting plays out most
prominently in standards of review under equal protection and due process. Rational basis review is basically equivalent to Thayerian deference
to all but clear errors. 20 Strict scrutiny refuses nearly all deference. 21 Intermediate scrutiny gives little deference. 22 And it is hard to know just
16. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTrUTON: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).

17. Id. at 263-65.
18. See, e.g., James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 256 (1992).
19. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). The Court continued:
The principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our
history, has been recognised by many successive legislatures, and has been
acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law
of undoubted obligation.
It will not be denied, that a bold and daring usurpation might be resisted,
after an acquiescence still longer and more complete than this. But it is conceived that a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and
the human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are
equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest
by the practice of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice. An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been
advanced, ought not to be lightly disregarded.
Id. It added, "These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the
impression that, were the question entirely new, the law would be found irreconcilable
with the constitution." Id. at 402.
20. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
21. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment) (describing strict scrutiny as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
22. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994).
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how much deference the undue burden test gives, short of putting the
particular question
to Justice O'Connor, an option no longer available in
23
adjudication.
But the sorting can be seen in other areas as well. For example, the
determination of political questions receive complete deference. 24 Exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, aided by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, is viewed with considerable deference, albeit with less than in the period prior to the 1990s, 25 while exercise of
congressional power under the little Necessary and Proper Clause of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is viewed skeptically. 26 Indeed,
perhaps the most perverse aspect of the Supreme Court's current Section
Five jurisprudence has been to confuse the standard of review with the
Constitution itself and thereby impose on Congress what had been a rule
27
of judicial deference.
The post-New Deal sorting mechanism, canonically represented by
United States v. Carolene Products and its Footnote Four, 28 can hardly be
viewed as continuing to govern. Not only do judges give little or no deference regarding various rights beyond the scope of Footnote Four, 29 but
they also (generally) give little or no deference to laws that burden racial
majorities in the interest of racial minorities. 30 The three (or is it now
four? five?) tiers of review are crumbling. 3 1 Grutter v. Bollinger purports
32
to use strict scrutiny yet defers to the views of university administrators.
Romer v. Evans purports to use rational basis scrutiny, but it is hard to
see much deference there. 33 Lawrence v. Texas simply ignores the standard of review. 3 4 First Amendment limitations on regulating political
contributions and expenditures get their own level of scrutiny, "Buckley
23. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
24. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
25. Compare Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) with United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
26. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1997).
27. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Seigel, Protecting the Constitutionfrom the People:
JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 41 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1649, 1653-54, 1707-12 (2005) (describing the error of equating a standard of review
with the constitution itself).
28. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
29. See BARNETr, supra note 16, at 232 ("Under what we might call Footnote FourPlus, some judicially favored unenumerated rights could also be used to shift the burden to
the government to justify its restrictions on liberty.").
30. See generally Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
31. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481
(2004).
32. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
33. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
34. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v.
Texas, The "FundamentalRight" That Dares Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893,
1916 (2004).
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scrutiny. ' '35 And who knows what the undue burden test will mean now
36
that Justice O'Connor has retired?
It is commonplace to array the justices of the Supreme Court on a single axis from left to right-liberal, moderate, conservative. Portrayed in a
single (obviously oversimplified) dimension, the Rehnquist Court looked
37
something like this:
Stevens, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Souter

Kennedy, O'Connor

Rehnquist, Scalia,
Thomas

Yet if we think about the Rehnquist Court in terms of deference and
allow ourselves two dimensions rather than one, we see something a bit
different. Of course, even two dimensions is a rather crude oversimplification, but two is better than one.
Stevens
Ginsburg
Breyer
Souter

Kennedy
O'Connor

Rehnquist
Scalia
Thomas
In one comer is a group of justices (Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer), who tend to defer regarding one
set of controversial constitutional issues (such as the scope of federal
power under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the permissibility of affirmative action) while not deferring on another set of such issues (such as government power to regulate
sexuality and reproduction challenged under the Due Process Clause). In
the opposite corner is a second group (the late Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia) who tend to do exactly the opposite, deferring on those issues that the first group does not defer but not deferring
on the issues where the first group does defer. Members of the two
groups often sound remarkably just like the other, albeit with regard to
different issues.
A third group (Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy) tends not to
defer on either set of issues. These justices are frequently called the
35. See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign
Finance: When Public Opinion Determines ConstitutionalLaw, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 126
(2004). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
36. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 1278, 1292 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker,
C.J., concurring) (noting that "lower courts can only guess as to how the Casey standard
should be applied").
37. For a slightly different order, see Lori A. Ringhand, JudicialActivism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, CONST. COMMENT.
(forthcoming) (Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas).
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moderates, but there is an important sense in which they are not moderate at all, but instead tend to be the least deferential, the most activist or
aggressive. 38 By joining with each of the other groups39 in some cases,
these two produced a remarkably nondeferential court.
One might logically expect a fourth group that tends to defer across the
broad range of controversial constitutional issues. Recall, for example,
Justice Byron White or Justice John Harlan. But this was an empty set
(or an empty seat) for more than a decade on the Rehnquist Court.
There is, however, some reason to hope that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito might fill this hole on the Supreme Court.
In sorting between those circumstances in which judges should defer to
nonjudicial constitutional interpretation and those in which they should
competence of courts as opnot, the focus should be on the comparative
40
posed to other government institutions.
Some, such as Professor John Hart Ely, view the courts as comparatively competent at protecting discrete and insular minorities from
prejudice, and some seem to think of them as comparatively competent at
protecting the poor, the weak, and the powerless in general. 4 1 But while
Ely and Footnote Four have led us to associate "discrete and insular"
with the poor, the politically weak, and especially with African-Americans, Bruce Ackerman pointed out more than twenty years ago that
"[o]ther things being equal, 'discreteness and insularity' will normally be
a source of enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for a
group engaged in pluralist American politics."' 42 He explained:
[F]or all our Carolenetalk about the powerlessness of insular groups,
we are perfectly aware of the enormous power such voting blocs
have in American politics. The story of the protective tariff is, I suppose, the classic illustration of insularity's power in American history. Over the past half-century, we have been treated to an
enormous number of welfare-state variations on the theme of insu38. See Posner, supra note 15, at 54 n.74 (explaining his use of the term "aggressive
judge" because "judicial activism" has become a "term of abuse for a decision that the
abuser does not like, rather than a description of decisions that expand the judicial role
relative to that of other branches of government"). It is hardly surprising that Professor
Barnett has been particularly enamored of Justice Kennedy. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice
Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21.
See also Posner, supra note 15, at 84 (describing Justice Kennedy as the "leading moral
vanguardist on the Supreme Court" whose slogan could be "Make the Constitution All It
Can Be").
39. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 15, at 56 ("Judicial modesty is not the order of the day
in the Supreme Court."). As the controlling voters on the Court, Justice Kennedy and
Justice O'Connor largely shaped its overall character; it is difficult to see how one can
simultaneously believe both that the Rehnquist Court was quite nondeferential and that
these Justices were anything other than nondeferential.
40. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994).
41. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

42.

(1985).

Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24
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larity by the farm bloc, the steel lobby, the auto lobby, and others
too numerous to mention. In this standard scenario of pluralistic
politics, it is precisely the diffuse character of the majority forced to
pay the bill for tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and the like, that allows
strategically located Congressmen to deliver the goods to their wellorganized local constituents. Given these familiar stories, it is really
quite remarkable to hear lawyers profess concern that insular interests have too little influence in Congress. Instead, the American system typically deprives diffuse groups of their rightful say over the
43
course of legislative policy.
Thus the real work in the formulation focused on prejudice against discrete and insular minorities is done by the concept of prejudice. 4 4 Yet it
is far from clear that courts are better than other institutions at distinguishing prejudice (or prejudgment) from any other judgment. 45 Indeed,
the long-term track record tends to show that Congress is better at seeking justice for the weak and powerless, with courts siding with the rich
6
and powerful.4
We should hardly be surprised. If designing an institution to protect
the poor and powerless, who would create one staffed by lawyers chosen
by the President and confirmed by the Senate? To the contrary, if we
were looking to design an institution to protect existing distributions of
wealth and power, what better way to do it than with life-tenured elites
chosen this way? As Professor Ely himself has observed, the federal judiciary functions as the institutional embodiment of today's aristocracy. 47
Moreover, as scholars such as Michael Klarman and Scot Powe have
43. Id. at 728.
44. Id. at 731 ("By detailing all the ways discrete and insular minorities gain political
advantage over diffuse and anonymous groups, I have meant to emphasize how heavy a
burden the idea of prejudice must carry in the overall argument for Carolene Products.").
45. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77
VA. L. REV. 747, 784 (1991):
By far the more controversial aspect of Ely's theory is his attempt to devise a
nonsubstantive theory of prejudice-that is, a formula by which courts can,
without making substantive value choices, invalidate a legislative cost-benefit
determination because of insufficient consideration of the interests of a particular fully enfranchised group. Indeed I believe that Ely's critics have
demonstrated that this task is impossible; there can be no nonsubstantive
theory of prejudice.
Cf Ackerman, supra note 42, at 737 ("One person's 'prejudice' is, notoriously, another's
'principle."'); id. at 740 ("The difference between the things we call 'prejudice' and the
things we call 'principle' is in the end a substantive moral difference.").
46. Robert J. Kaczorowski, PopularConstitutionalism Versus Justice in Plainclothes,73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1438 (2005) (noting that "history suggests that Congress may be
more reliable in bringing about the 'justice-seeking account' of constitutional practice than

the Supreme Court"). Cf WALDRON, supra note 10, at 302 (noting that "it is an open
question whether judicial review has made the United States . . . more just than it would
have been without that practice"). See generally JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S
OF RIGHTS (1998) (tracing the reliance on judges to the middle of the twentieth century and describing earlier
reliance on legislation or the broader public as the guardians of rights).
47. See John Hart Ely, The Apparent Inevitability of Mixed Government, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 283, 289 (1999) (noting that the federal judiciary is "comparatively old, welleducated, isolated, thoughtful, and wise").
LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS
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shown, courts tend to protect minorities-not when they are most powerless-but rather when they achieve a fair degree of political power and
of a governing coalition or as otherwise important
support either as 4part
8
to national elites.
Ely and his followers also call for less deference to self-serving constitutional interpretations, that is, interpretations that bolster the interpreter's own hold on power.4 9 At least where it is possible to clearly
identify this kind of bias, it is hard to argue with this position. However,
there is some danger that, unless cabined, this principle would call for
skepticism whenever any branch exercises any power. To avoid this danger, it is important to limit it to situations where the interpreter is not
of power but also is attempting to enmerely justifying its own exercise
50
trench that exercise of power.
While this principle is generally articulated as a basis for judges to decline to defer to the decisions of politicians, notice that it also suggests
that politicians should give less deference to constitutional interpretation
by judges that benefits the judges' own hold on power. Thus not only
should judges be less deferential to legislative action that protects incumbent legislators from displacement, but Congress and the President
should also be less deferential to judicial action that protects incumbent
51
judges from displacement or that entrenches judicial interpretations.
As a matter of institutional design, this is simply "ambition counteracting
52
ambition" in action.
Others, such as Alexander Bickel, view the courts as comparatively
competent at discovering, protecting, and advancing our deepest national
values. 53 For him and his followers, judges can be scholars of principle, if
48. See generally MICHAEL J.

KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SULUCAS A. (ScoT)

PREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004);
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).

49. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 331; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1998);
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 498 (1997).
50. Cf.WALDRON, supra note 10, at 304 (arguing that "we should resist the temptation
to say" that "democratic politics is just an unholy scramble for personal advantage" "simply because we find ourselves contradicted or outvoted on some matter of principle.... If
we ascribe someone's political difference with us to the influence of self-interest, that must
be justified as a special explanation, over and above the normal explanation of human
disagreement about complex questions.").
51. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
52. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed.,
1880). Cf Daryl J.Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2365-68 (2006) (arguing that the ability of Congress and the President
to constrain the Judiciary varies depending on whether or not one party controls both
Houses of Congress and the Presidency).

53. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). See, e.g., Posner, supra note 15, at 81
(describing Bickel as "cast[ing] the Court in the role of a secular Moses that would lead the
American people out of their moral wilderness").

1744

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

not genuine prophets, in contrast to the merchants of expediency who
govern in other branches. On this view, when judges see threats to those
deepest values, or openings to advance those values, they should not be
deferential to the unprincipled politicians worried only about
54
expediency.
As a matter of institutional design, if one were looking for those most
attuned to our deepest values, it is again hard to see why we would turn
to lawyers-particularly those lawyers who are known and favored by
presidents and senators. 55 Nor to my mind has anyone answered Judge
Learned Hand's lament that it would be most "irksome to be ruled by a
bevy of Platonic Guardians," even if one did know how to choose them.56
If ever judges had the time and inclination to follow the ways of the
scholar, it is scarcely true today with burgeoning caseloads and managerial judges. 57 As a matter of history, judges do not lead prophetic movements: at worst they suppress those movements, at best they aid those
social movements that have already made substantial gains among na58
tional elites.
For still others, such as Justice Scalia, judges are comparatively good at
textual and historical analysis. 59 The judicial track record on historical
analysis is questionable; if the key is getting the history right, certainly
54. Cf.WALDRON, supra note 10, at 1384 (noting that "it is striking how rich the reasoning is in legislative debates on important issues of rights in countries without judicial
review"). See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1990).
55. Posner, supra note 15, at 77 (Supreme Court Justices are "privileged, sheltered,
and, most of them, quite wealthy." Further, "in a democratic society ... it is difficult to
justify giving a committee of lawyer-aristocrats the power not just to find or apply the law
and make up enough law to fill in the many gaps in the law that is given to them, but also
to create law" in the form of constitutional interpretation that "makes mistakes exceedingly difficult to correct ... even when those mistakes are usurpative ....").
56. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGI-rs 73 (1958). See also WALDRON, supra note
10, at 264 (noting that "Aristotle would call 'aristocracy"' a system that leaves it to judges
to decide those questions on which people disagree); id. at 297 (noting that "often our
scholarly talk about when 'the people' or 'the majority' may be entrusted (by us?) with
decisions about rights has something of the haughty air of a John Stuart Mill talking de
haut en bas about native self-government in India"); Waldron, supra note 10, at 1375 (noting the "sense of principle that is at stake when someone asks indignantly, "How dare they
exclude my say-disenfranchise me-from this decision, which affects me and to which I
am subject?"); id. at 1353 ("By privileging majority voting among a small number of
unelected and unaccountable judges, [judicial review] disenfranchises ordinary citizens and
brushes aside cherished principles of representation and political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights.").
57. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 376 (1982). And it
would be hard to argue that the recent reduction in the Supreme Court's caseload has
made them more scholarly and better philosophers, although it may lead them to think so.
See Posner, supra note 15, at 64-75 (discussing the reduction in caseload, the lack of deliberation, and poor use of scholarship); id. at 77 ("Cocooned in their marble palace, attended by sycophantic staff, and treated with extreme deference wherever they go,
Supreme Court Justices are at risk of acquiring exaggerated opinions of their ability and
character.")
58. See generally AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); Klarman, supra note 45; PowE, supra note 48.

59. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). This is not to say that Justice Scalia finds that courts are

particularly good at history; rather, he finds originalism, with its dependence on history,
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Congress is institutionally better situated to draw on leading historians
than are judges aided by recent law review editors. 60 While legally
trained judges may well be better at textual analysis than other government officials, few constitutional questions that actually get litigated can
be answered by sophisticated textual analysis alone. 61 In such few instances, there would seem to be good reason for judges to be less
deferential.
So far, then, we have two standing reasons to prefer constitutional interpretation by judges over constitutional interpretation by other
branches. Courts should be less deferential when the other interpreter is
attempting to lock in his or her own power and in those relatively rare
litigated cases where pure textual analysis provides a clear answer. Is
there any other reason?
I think so. Proposed legislation typically involves multiple provisions
bundled together in a single bill. As has been recognized since Aristotle,
legislation almost invariably will apply to multiple situations, including
some that even the most prescient legislator cannot foresee. 62 Faced with
a proposed bill that contains provisions that the legislator believes constitutional bundled with provisions that the legislator believes unconstitutional, a conscientious legislator may decide nevertheless to vote for the
bill. Particularly in the House of Representatives, the legislator may have
little opportunity to anmend the bill, and even in the Senate, the legislator
may not succeed in doing so. Similarly, a conscientious President
presented with a bill that contains provisions that the President believes
constitutional, bundled with provisions that the President believes uncon63
stitutional, may nevertheless decide to sign the bill.
the lesser evil than nonoriginalism. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989).
60. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV.
119. The kinds of historical questions relevant to constitutional interpretation are legislative facts rather than adjudicative facts; they are not the sort of factual determinations that
are made by trial courts based on the evidence presented and to which appellate judges
must defer. Amicus briefs can certainly help judges (including appellate judges) understand history, but the legislative process makes it possible for Congress to ask historians
questions, both formally and informally. Moreover, Congress can explore such historical
questions with a wide range of historians over a period of years before reaching a
conclusion.
61. Cf Posner, supra note 15, at 52-53.
I do not even mean to deny that some constitutional cases can be decided as
conventional legal cases by lining up the facts alongside the constitutional
text. Those tend, however, to be hypothetical cases .... But cases that clear
arise very infrequently, and when they do they rarely reach the Supreme
Court.
62. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics bk. V, ch. 10 (D.P. Chase ed., Dover Publications 1998).
63. See Frank Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 905, 917
(1989-90); Robert H. Jackson, A PresidentialLegal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 135758 (1953). But see Michael Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 736, 773 (1992) (arguing that legislators and presidents must not vote for or sign
bills with unconstitutional provisions). Even the American Bar Association's Task Force
on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers, which recommended
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In addition, both the legislator and the President may well support a
bill that has numerous constitutional applications, even if they can imagine unconstitutional applications, and surely may support a bill even
though they acknowledge that it might have as-yet-unimagined unconstitutional applications. The likelihood of support in either situation depends on how central the provision thought to be unconstitutional is to
the entire bill, how important enactment of the entire bill is even with the
provision thought to be unconstitutional, and the relative frequency and
importance of constitutional versus unconstitutional applications of the
bill one envisions.
While legislators and presidents have limited ability to unbundle legislation,64 courts, in contrast, specialize in unbundling. It is precisely where
their comparative competence lies. They do not vote on, sign, or veto a
bill as a whole, but rather enter judgments resolving individual cases.
This specialization in resolving individual cases leads to unbundling in
both senses. First, an individual case may well involve only one particular
provision of a complex bill. Second, an individual case may well involve
only a single application of a bill, not the entire range of possible
applications.
The comparative competence of courts in unbundling leads us to another way to sort levels of deference in litigated cases. If the case involves a provision that was central to the bill, and an application that was
readily foreseen, there is reason to defer. If, on the other hand, the case
involves a provision that was not central to the bill, or an application that
was not among the core foreseen applications of the bill, there is less
reason to defer.
that the President veto any bill "if he believes that all or part of [it] is unconstitutional,"
Recommendation of the American Bar Association's Task Force on Presidential Signing
Statements and the Separation of Powers, acknowledged that sometimes "practical exigencies militate against a veto." ABA, TASK FORCE ON THE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, REPORT 23 (2006). Among the
many flaws in that startlingly simplistic report are its casual assumption of judicial
supremacy and its conflation of a power (perhaps a duty) not to enforce unconstitutional
statutes with a general dispensing power. Cf CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861, supra note 4, at 175-76 (noting that while the view
that the "President was bound to disregard unconstitutional provisions even after signing a
law" has "not received universal approval," as
Attorneys General and their lawyers have frequently maintained, it is at least
arguable that the logic of Jackson's Bank veto message equally demonstrates
that the Constitution does not require the President to enforce unconstitu-

tional laws. For as we know from Marbury v. Madison an unconstitutional

statute is no law at all, and the Constitution itself is one of the laws the President has sworn to enforce. Like Jackson's veto and Jefferson's pardon, [Attorney General] Black's assertion of the President's obligation not to execute
unconstitutional laws offers us an additional check to ensure that the Constitution is respected; it does nothing to impair the alternative safeguard of judicial review. James Wilson, second only to Madison as sculptor and initial
expositor of the Constitution, had prefigured Black's interpretation during
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: Just as judges would declare unconstitutional statutes void, the President would refuse to enforce them.)
(citations omitted).
64. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998).
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In the first case, it is difficult to see how a legislator could conscientiously support the bill, or a President sign it, without reaching a determination that the provision can be constitutionally applied in such a case.
In the second case, by contrast, it is quite easy to see how a legislator
could conscientiously support the bill, or a President sign it, without
reaching such a determination.
Significantly, I suggest that this distinction maps directly onto Marbury
and McCulloch. The Marbury case involved one application of a relatively obscure provision in a crucial enactment: the provision in section
thirteen of the Judiciary Act of 1789 providing original mandamus jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. 65 That Act established the national judiciary; until it was enacted, there were no lower federal courts, and no
Supreme Court. It covered a wide range of topics, from the creation of
district courts, circuit courts, and Supreme Court, to the terms and juris66
diction of those courts.
A conscientious legislator or President who believed that the mandamus provision of section thirteen would be an unconstitutional attempt to
expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction could well decide to
support or sign the bill, given that it was bundled with the provisions necessary to get the judicial branch of the government up and running. Indeed, considering that the mandamus provision itself could be
constitutionally applied in some cases, a conscientious legislator or President could support that provision itself because the text covered both
67
constitutional and unconstitutional applications.
By contrast, the McCulloch case involved the constitutionality of a law
establishing the bank of the United States. 68 The establishment of the
bank was central to the bill; it was its very purpose. It is difficult to imagine how a conscientious legislator or President could support or sign such
a bill without determining that it was constitutional for the national government to establish a bank.
65. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
66. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 73.
67. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1321, 1337 n.91 (2000) (noting that Marbury "did not invali-

date that linguistic unit of the statute insofar as it authorized the Supreme Court to issue
writs of mandamus in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction"). In addition, nothing in
Marbury suggests that the mandamus provision would be unavailable in the limited range
of cases allocated to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2
(providing for Supreme Court original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party"). Cf. Ex
parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374 (1879) ("Having this general power to issue the writ [of
habeas corpus], the court may issue it in the exercise of original jurisdiction where it has
original jurisdiction."). Do members of the ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements really believe that President Washington should have vetoed the Judiciary Act of
1789?
68. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819). The Bank of the
United States was first created by the Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 5, § 1, 1 Stat. 191, 191. The
statute involved in McCulloch was the Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44 § 1, 3 Stat. 266, 266.
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As one important factor in deciding when to defer and when not to
defer, I suggest that courts should focus on their comparative competence
to unbundle particular statutory provisions from larger bills and to unbundle particular applications of statutory provisions in particular cases.
II.

FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES

Supreme Court jurisprudence is in disarray concerning facial and asapplied challenges to the constitutionality of statutes. In United States v.
Salerno, the Supreme Court stated that it had "not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,"
and that, in all other contexts, a facial challenge can only succeed by
showing that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid."'69 Since then, various scholars have argued that the Supreme
Court has actually been more receptive to facial challenges in a variety of
other areas, including the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection
70
Clause, and substantive due process challenges to abortion statutes.
Matthew Adler has gone so far as to1 suggest that nearly all constitutional
7
decisions involve facial challenges.
In opinions issued in connection with a denial of certiorari, Justices Stevens and Scalia sparred over whether the Salerno test should apply in
challenges to abortion statutes. Justice Stevens characterized the Salerno
statement as a mere "rhetorical flourish," that was both unwise and a
departure from precedent, 72 while Justice Scalia described it as accurately
summarizing "a long established principle of our jurisprudence. '73 Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide that question last
74
term, it did not do so.
69. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S 739, 745 (1987).
70. RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 196 (5th ed. 2003); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State
and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1994); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making
Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859 n.29 (1991) ("Virtually all of the abortion
cases reaching the Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade ...have involved facial attacks on
state statutes, and the Court, whether accepting or rejecting the challenges on the merits,
has typically accepted this framing of the question presented."); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement,48 AM. U. L. REV.
359, 361-62 (1998).
71. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 157 (1998). Professor Fallon, on the other hand, contends that litigants challenging a statute are always arguing that the statute cannot be
enforced against them and that all constitutional challenges "are in an important sense, asapplied." Fallon, supra note 67, at 1336-39.
72. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of cert.).
73. Id. at 1178 (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of cert.).
74. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S.Ct. 961, 964-69 (2006)
(unanimously remanding for consideration of narrower relief). The first question
presented was the following:
Did the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals apply the correct standard in a facial challenge to a statute regulating abortion when it ruled that
the undue burden standard cited in Planned Parenthoodof S.E. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992) and Stenberg v. Carhart,530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000)
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In the meantime, the question has spread to a wide range of constitutional areas. Indeed, dispute, confusion, and uncertainty regarding facial
versus as-applied constitutional challenges are becoming ubiquitous.
Consider the Commerce Clause. The recent decisions concluding that
statutes are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause were conclusions of facial invalidity. 75 The Court did not explore whether the Gun
Free School Zone Act could be constitutionally applied to the particular
conduct involved in Lopez, or whether the Violence Against Women Act
could constitutionally be applied to the particular conduct involved in
Morrison.76 Nor did it insist on a showing that no set of circumstances
exist under which the Act would be valid. 77 Nevertheless, it found the
criminal prohibition in the former and78the private civil remedy in the latter unconstitutional across the board.
Moreover, in deciding on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines under the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, the majority found the relevant portions of the statute mandating the Guidelines
unconstitutional on their face. 79 Justice Thomas, by contrast, evaluated
the two individual cases before the Court to determine if the Guidelines
could be constitutionally applied to their particular cases. 80 Similar disputes or uncertainty have now spread to the adequacy of state procedural
grounds to block Supreme Court review of state court judgments or federal habeas for those in state custody, 8 1 and even to the Spending
Clause. 82 In the Spending Clause context, the Court went out of its way
to add an afterword discouraging facial attacks alleging overbreadth,
while noting that it has recognized the validity of such attacks in "relatively few settings" including free speech, the right to travel, abortion,
83
and legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This last category-legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment-provides the most striking aspect of the current uncertainty. Most of the recent cases finding acts of Congress unconstitutional
under Section Five appear to find those acts unconstitutional on their
applied rather than the "no set of circumstances" standard set forth in United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. 961 (No. 04-1144). See Nat'l Abortion
Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, C.J., concurring) (noting that
the Court in Ayotte "chose not to address the most controversial issue before it"). See also
text accompanying notes 115-25 infra for further discussion of Ayotte.
75. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
76. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
77. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
78. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
79. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249 (2005).,
80. Id. at 313-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
81. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 379-83 (2002); Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State ProceduralRules, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
243, 246-48 (2003).
82. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 604-05 (2004).
83. Id. at 608-10.
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face. 84 Indeed, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court apparently held a statute abrogating the state's sovereign immunity from patent claims to be invalid on
its face, over Justice Stevens's specific argument in dissent that the statute
should be upheld as-applied to the particular patent infringement involved in the case. 85 Yet in Tennessee v. Lane-decided the same day as
the Court listed Section Five cases as among those in which such facial
challenges were appropriate-the Court followed the approach that Justice Stevens had advocated in his FloridaPrepaid dissent, upholding Title
II of the Americans with Disability
Act ("ADA") as applied to the partic86
ular cases before the Court.
Not only has the Court-or, more accurately, Justice O'Connor 87flip-flopped on whether to accept Justice Stevens's as-applied approach
under Section Five, but Justice Stevens and Scalia-who have been debating this issue with each other for nearly a decade-emerge on different sides of the battle in different contexts. In the abortion and gay rights
context, Justice Scalia resists facial challenges and insists that a statute
not be found facially invalid if there are any circumstances in which the
statute would be constitutional, while Justice Stevens happily finds statutes unconstitutional on their face.88 In the Section Five context, Justice
Stevens resists facial challenges and insists that a statute not be found
facially invalid if it can be constitutionally applied, while Justice Scalia
happily finds statutes unconstitutional on their face. 89 Justice Scalia is
84. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
613 (2000). The decision in Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 72425, 733-34, 743 (2003), upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), also appears to have a facial rather than an as applied character. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial
Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 896-97 (2005).
The father of this line of cases, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997), a
similarly appears to find Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") unconstitutional
on its face. See Metzger, supra at 894 (describing Boerne as "a good example of the seemingly facial character of these decisions"); id. at 894 n.94 (noting that Sabri identifies
Boerne as a facial challenge). Boerne also illustrates well Professor Metzger's point that
these Section Five cases may be less facial than first appears and that facial and as-applied
constitute a continuum, not a dichotomy. See id. at 877. RFRA may well survive as applied to the federal government. Id. at 899-900. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1225 (2006) (applying RFRA to the national government without discussion of its constitutionality, apparently because neither
party raised the issue (nor was in a position to do so)).
85. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639-41, 653-54 (1999).
86. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2004). See also United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 20, 24-25 (1960) (upholding, under Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment,
a provision of the 1957 Civil Rights Act as applied to state officials, and reversing the lower
court's judgment that the provision was unconstitutional on its face because it also applied
to private actors).
87. Justice O'Connor was the only one to join the majority in both FloridaPrepaidand
Lane. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 12 (Supp. 2005).

88. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938, 956 (2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
631-32, 640-41 (1996).
89. Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31, 541-44; FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 629-41, 653-54.
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also receptive to facial challenges under the Commerce Clause, while Justice Stevens has not (at least yet) argued for upholding a statute as applied on Commerce Clause grounds. 90 Both resisted a facial challenge in
the context of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 91 And neither
has shown much attraction to finding a statute unconstitutional as applied
92
under the Commerce Clause.
In short, the law is this area is a mess. 93 Focusing on the comparative
competence of the courts can help in resolving the muddle.
As Gillian Metzger has observed, "existing scholarship generally agrees
that the debate regarding the availability of facial challenges is, at bottom, fundamentally a debate about severability. ' 94 That is, the fundamental question is whether a particular application of a statute can be
severed from other applications of the statute. If the particular application at issue can be severed, then a court can refuse to apply the statute in
the particular case where it is unconstitutional, without addressing the
validity of the statute more generally. Similarly, if the particular application at issue can be severed, then a court can apply the statute in the
particular case where it is constitutional, without addressing the validity
of the statute more generally.
At this juncture, focusing on the comparative competence of the courts
with regard to constitutional interpretation can help. As discussed above,
courts are comparatively competent at unbundling both particular statutory provisions and particular applications of those provisions. 95 That is,
courts have a comparative competence in deciding severed constitutional
questions.
In light of the comparative competence of courts in deciding severed
constitutional questions, courts should be quite reluctant to overcome the
presumption of severability, 96 and thus quite reluctant to conclude that a
statutory provision with some constitutional applications is facially unconstitutional and cannot be enforced at all. Courts have little comparative competence regarding facial challenges to statutes and should largely
be confined to the as-applied constitutional challenges where their com90. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613, 628-35 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S 549, 602-03 (1995); but see Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10
(2004) (listing areas in which facial overbreadth challenges have been recognized, including

free speech, abortion, and Section Five, but not the Commerce Clause); id. at 610 (Kennedy and Scalia, JJ., concurring) (declining to join the afterword, and noting that the Court
"does not specifically question" the practice of facial invalidation in Commerce Clause
cases such as Lopez and Morrison).
91. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225-26, 234-35 (2005).
92. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208-09, 2215 (2005); cf id. at 2229, 2237

(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If medical marijuana patients like Monson and Raich largely
stand outside the interstate drug market, then courts must excise them from the CSA's
coverage.").
93. See FALLON, MELTZER, & SHAPIRO, supra note 87, at 13 (asking if there is "any
principled explanation of when the Court will entertain overbreadth facial challenges and
when it will not"); Fallon, supra note 67, at 1358-59 (noting the "reigning confusion").
94. Metzger, supra note 84, at 887 (citations omitted).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
96. See Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217,219-20 (1912).
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parative competence lies. They should concentrate on what they are comparatively good at: determining whether a particular application of a
particular statute is constitutional.
Of course, severability is ultimately a matter of statutory interpretation. If a legislature provides that particular provisions or particular applications are not severable, a court should honor that legislative choice.
Moreover, if a state court construes a state statute to be nonseverable,
federal courts should adhere to that interpretation of state law. 97 But
legislatures should be (and are) reluctant to so provide, and the comparative competence of courts supports that reluctance. Similarly, the comparative competence of courts also supports John Nagle's proposal of a
clear statement rule that calls for severability "unless the legislature
clearly states in the text of the statute its intention that a statutory provision is nonseverable. ' 98 This comparative competence has another effect,
for (again, in Metzger's words), "[s]cholars also agree that, given the role
played by severability, the availability of facial challenges ultimately turns
on the substantive constitutional doctrines that govern in a particular
area." 99 Henry Monaghan led the way here, arguing that it was substantive First Amendment doctrine that required an exception to the ordinary
presumption of severability and therefore made facial challenges more
readily available. 100 Michael Dorf pointed out that substantive Establishment Clause and Equal Protection doctrine, by testing for an illegitimate
purpose, similarly make facial challenges more readily available. 10 1 Indeed, Richard Fallon has argued that there are no transsubstantive rules
governing facial challenges, but instead that courts sometimes apply doctrinal tests in particular substantive areas that 1) sweep more broadly
than other doctrinal tests, or 2) limit the availability of severing unconstitutional provisions or applications from constitutional ones. 10 2 "[W]hen a
court upholds a constitutional challenge, the nature of the test that it applies will determine whether the statute is found unconstitutional solely
97. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) ("The task of determining the
intention of the state legislature in this respect, like the usual function of interpreting a
state statute, rests primarily upon the state court. Its decision as to the severability of a
provision is conclusive upon this Court."). See also Dorf, supra note 70, at 283-86.
98. John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 254 (1993). He notes that
a judicially created clear statement rule would be better than a more easily dislodged presumption of severability and that a "legislatively enacted clear statement rule providing
that all statutes should be construed as severable absent a specific nonseverability clause"
would be "best of all." Id. at 232-33.
99. Metzger, supra note 84, at 888.
100. Henry Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 24-25 (arguing that it is the
substantive law of the first amendment that limits the availability of severability).
101. Dorf, supra note 70, at 279-80.
102. Fallon, supra note 67, at 1351. See also id. at 1368 ("The crucial, mediating variables are the general principles or doctrinal tests that courts apply in deciding constitutional cases. Some tests require courts to engage in processes of reasoning with the
potential to mark a statute as invalid on its face, not merely as applied."); Dorf, supra note
70, at 294 (noting that the "distinction between as-applied and facial challenges may confuse more than it illuminates" and that "the proper approach to a constitutional case typically turns on the applicable substantive constitutional doctrine and the institutional
setting, not the classification as a facial or as-applied challenge").
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as applied, in part or in whole.' 10 3
This insight-that substantive constitutional doctrine affects the availability of facial challenges-leads to another: because the way in which
courts fashion substantive constitutional doctrinal tests affects the availability of facial challenges, it therefore also affects the ability of courts to
capitalize on their comparative competence. Thus, it is not simply that
the availability of facial challenges turns on the substantive constitutional
doctrine, but that constitutional doctrine should itself be shaped with an
awareness of the extent to which it will tend to produce judicial decisions
that decide the constitutionality of a statute as a whole. 10 4 Courts should
be cognizant of this effect and reluctant to embrace substantive doctrine
that undermines their own comparative competence.
This does not mean that courts should never embrace doctrinal tests
that sweep broadly or limit the availability of severance. But courts
should only embrace such doctrinal tests in full recognition that in so doing, they are sacrificing an important comparative competence of courts.
Sometimes such a test might be unavoidable. For example, in a dispute
over whether a bill became law despite an attempted pocket veto, either
the bill as a whole was properly vetoed or the bill as a whole became law
despite the attempted pocket veto. 10 5 Beyond this, however, the best justification for such doctrinal tests-perhaps the only one 1 06-is that a dif103. Fallon, supra note 67, at 1339.
104. Some might object that courts have no business taking such considerations into
account in interpreting the Constitution. Note, however, how far-reaching such an objection would be: if considerations of comparative institutional competence are inappropriate,
then the entire structure of judicial review, with different levels of judicial scrutiny, must be
swept aside as well.
Moreover, regardless of how narrow or broad the considerations that a court may consider in shaping judicial doctrine to implement the Constitution, see generally, e.g., Mitchell
N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 (2004); Fallon, supra note 70;
Roosevelt, supra note 27, it is difficult to see why a court should not be able to at least take
into account the comparative competence of the institutions themselves constituted by the
Constitution. Such comparative competence is rooted in the structure of the Constitution
itself. Moreover, the Constitution plainly contemplates that each branch will interpret the
Constitution in carrying out its duties, and that the branches in interacting will frequently
confront prior constitutional interpretations by others. In deciding how to handle those
interactions, should one ignore the respective attributes of those branches? Surely not,
particularly considering that a court facing a constitutional question frequently must adopt
some posture regarding the influence of prior constitutional interpretations on its answer
to that question. (Adopting such a posture can be avoided only if the court independently
agrees with the prior interpreters.)
105. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 673-74 (1929). Although they do not
mention the pocket veto, it would seem that whether a bill has been validly vetoed represents an example of what Professors Adler and Dorf label "constitutional existence conditions." See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, ConstitutionalExistence Conditions and
JudicialReview, 89 VA. L. REv. 1105, 1108-09 (2003). Although they are correct that some
constitutional provisions generate existence conditions, they have a rather expansive view
of what counts as an existence condition, as might be expected given their view of facial
challenges. See Adler, supra note 71, at 157; Doff, supra note 70, at 238-39.
106. Professor Fallon suggests that such robust protection is appropriate "where constitutional values are unusually vulnerable." Fallon, supra note 67, at 1352. But a determination of which constitutional values are unusually vulnerable largely returns us to the
competing claims of comparative competence discussed above. See supra notes 51-61 and
accompanying text.
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ferent comparative competence is also in play, such as the comparative
competence of courts to evaluate legislation that attempts to entrench
legislators' own grip on power.
It might be thought, particularly given the current prominence of the
dispute in the area of abortion, that doctrine that facilitates addressing
statutes on their face always tends to increase judicial findings of unconstitutionality, while doctrine that instead facilitates addressing statutes as
applied always tends to limit judicial findings of unconstitutionality. But
doctrine that discourages (or completely blocks) as-applied challenges
can serve to reduce judicial findings of unconstitutionality, and doctrine
that facilitates as-applied challenges can sometimes work (at least where
a finding of facial unconstitutionality is unlikely) to make judicial findings
of unconstitutionality more likely.
The Commerce Clause illustrates the point. It was unlikely that the
federal law against possession of marijuana would be found unconstitutional on its face, but dissenting justices argued that it should be found
unconstitutional as applied. 10 7 (In contrast, the government seemed to
argue that there is effectively no such thing as an as-applied Commerce
Clause challenge. 10 8 ) That same approach could be used to find any
Professor David H. Gans argues that courts should engage in "strategic" facial invalidations when "some defect in case-by-case adjudication" makes facial invalidation a better
means of implementing the Constitution. David H. Gans, StrategicFacial Challenges, 85 B.
U. L. REV. 1333, 1351-52 (2005). This approach appears to rest on the assumption that the
judicial view of the constitution-even where the Judiciary is at its comparative disadvantage - is the correct one, while the key question to be decided in constitutional litigation is
whether (and to what extent) the Judiciary should defer to the constitutional interpretation
of others. In other words, it seems to assume judicial supremacy. Worse, it calls for courts
to assert broader interpretive power precisely in those situations where they are defective.
Moreover, this approach appears to fall into the error of treating the Judiciary's primary
role to be interpreting the Constitution, with the "case or controversy" requirement as a
side limitation on the power-indeed, a limitation that sometimes needs to be compensated for in the name of wise policing of the rest of the government. But see John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpretingthe Constitution,73
CORNELL L. REV. 371, 373 (1988):
The Constitution allocates to the courts the case deciding power, the power
to issue judgments, that is where the duty to obey judgments comes from.
The power to interpret the Constitution, however, comes from the case deciding power. To suggest that the power to interpret is primary and the casedeciding power secondary, is to misinterpret the Constitution and to confuse
cause and effect.
See also Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 123, 147 n.139 (1999) ("We do not create courts to announce the law and then decide
to constrain that function with the 'case or controversy' limitation; instead, we create
courts to decide cases and controversies, and, because those courts want their controversial
decisions accepted, they tend to explain those decisions with generalized reasons.").
107. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26, 84-85, 107 (2005). The petitioners in Raich conceded the facial constitutionality of the statute.
108. At oral argument, Justice Stevens asked, "So you're saying that this statute could
never have an unconstitutional application?" General Clement responded:
Under the Commerce Clause, I-that's exactly right, that would be our position. It is constitutional on its face, and it-and because of that line of authority, an as applied challenge can be brought, but the legal test that's
applied in the as-applied challenge is one that considers the constitutionality
of the statute as a whole.
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number of federal statutes unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
in particular circumstances. For example, it is unlikely that various environmental statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, would be found
unconstitutional on their face. Doctrine that facilitates as-applied challenges, however, could yield some individual findings of unconstitutionality in particular cases.
If the idea that facilitating as-applied challenges might result in more
judicial findings of unconstitutionality seems counterintuitive, consider
what is probably the most common constitutional question that courts
decide: the constitutionality of exercising personal jurisdiction. While on
occasion statutes providing for personal jurisdiction have been found unconstitutional on their face, 10 9 current doctrine, with its emphasis on determining whether a particular defendant has purposeful contacts with
the forum state, the relationship between those contacts, and the claim
raised in the action, and whether it is reasonable to require a particular
defendant to defend a particular claim there, plainly points toward asapplied determinations of the constitutionality of exercises of personal
jurisdiction.' 10 If the doctrine were instead shaped in a way that tended
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (No. 03-1454). Cf Glenn H.
Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 915, 913 (2005) ("Whatever the effects of Raich on lower courts ...
one
thing is clear: the as-applied challenges to which lower courts had been warming are likely
over.").
109. See Dorf, supra note 70, at 281-82 (citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928)
and Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)). Wuchter found a New Jersey statute unconstitutional because it failed to require that a state official serving as the agent for a nonresident motorist provide notice to nonresidents, even though the official in Wuchter did in
fact provide such notice. Wuchter, 276 U.S. at 15-16, 18-19. Similarly, Shaffer found unconstitutional a Delaware statute authorizing personal jurisdiction based on the ownership
of shares in a Delaware corporation, even though the defendants in Shaffer were not
merely shareholders, but officers of a Delaware corporation. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-90,
214, 216-17. Both decisions have been criticized for this approach. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 cmt. d (1982) (noting that "more discerning cases" than
Wuchter "have recognized that the requirement is adequate notice and that it is fulfilled by
actual notice whose tenor indicates it ought to be taken seriously. They thus return to the
rule as it was understood before Wuchter v. Pizzutti."); Earl Maltz, Reflections on a
Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a Distance, 1986 BYU L. REV. 1043, 1052
("Shaffer's result has been justly criticized. It seems rather strange to characterize as fundamentally unfair the assertion of jurisdiction over the officers and directors of a domestic
corporation in a lawsuit focusing on the effect of their activities on that corporation.").
110. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See also Taylor v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 778 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)
(rejecting the argument that since the defendant "meets the statutory criteria for doing
business in Arizona" it "thereby meets the threshold contacts required," and noting that it
had previously "found that to the extent [the long-arm statute] could be read to confer
jurisdiction, it is unconstitutional as applied" to similar facts); Harlo Prods. Corp. v. J. I.
Case Co., 360 So. 2d 1328, 1329 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding provision of long arm
statute "unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case"); Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v.
Yarbrough, 352 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding provision of long arm
statute "unconstitutional in its application to the circumstances of this case"); Park Ave.
Partners v. Johnson, 342 S.E.2d 570, 571 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that appellants
concede that G.S. 1-75.4 confers jurisdiction on the superior court. They contend that this statute is unconstitutional as applied to them. If the contacts of
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to evaluate statutes providing for personal jurisdiction on their face, it
seems quite likely that they would be upheld. For example, would anyone find unconstitutional on its face a state statute providing for long arm
jurisdiction over those who commit a tortious act in the state? Similarly,
the very point of Justice Brennan's approach to transient jurisdictionunlike Justice Scalia's-would be to open up the possibility of as-applied

challenges to such jurisdiction. 1 '
Doctrine that favors facial challenges over as-applied challenges, therefore, does not necessarily increase the judicial conclusions of unconstitutionality. Instead, as Professor Cathie Struve has pointed out, facial
112
challenges raise the stakes.
This feature of facial challenges may help to explain why the Roberts
Court has issued a series of unanimous rulings that lean heavily toward
as-applied challenges. These cases cut across the broad swath of constitutional areas involving the question of facial as opposed to as-applied challenges: Congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
a party with a state are sufficient so that the maintenance of a lawsuit against
that party does not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice," the long arm statute is not unconstitutional as applied.).
Findings of as-applied unconstitutionality would be ubiquitous if states did not have longarm statutes that either explicitly provide for personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process or have been so construed. See, e.g., Batton v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 736 P.2d 2,
4 (Ariz. 1987):
Although Batton's two-step argument-looking first at the long-arm rule and
then at due process-is based on well-established Arizona case law, it unnecessarily complicates the jurisdictional inquiry ....
[T]his two-step inquiry is
redundant because our interpretation extends Rule 4(e)(2) to the permissible
limits of due process. Consequently, if the constitutionally required minimum
contacts are present, the defendant's conduct necessarily satisfies Rule
4(e)(2).
(citation omitted).
111. Compare Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 639-40 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that "as a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant based on his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the requirements
of due process," and that "[i]n this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was served with
process while voluntarily and knowingly in the State of California") with id. at 619 (Scalia,
J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("jurisdiction based on physical presence alone
constitutes due process").
112. Struve, supra note 81, at 254 ("Perhaps a more cynical view might be that the
dissenters' opposition to as-applied adequacy review serves the function of raising the
stakes.").
Here, too, we can see a connection with severability: a statutory nonseverability provision raises the stakes by insisting that the nonseverable provisions (or applications) stand
or fall together. As Senator Schumer put it regarding a proposed amendment to the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill:
I rise in adamant opposition to the nonseverability amendment. At the outset, let us be very clear about the unmistakable goal of this amendment. It
has been signed, sealed, and delivered primarily by opponents of the bill for
one and only one purpose: as a poison pill.
147 CONG. REc. S3084-02 (2001). See also Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REv. 997, 1001 (2005) (noting that a nonseverability clause can
serve "an in terrorem function, as the legislature attempts to guard against judicial review
altogether by making the price of invalidation too great," or as a "sort of poison-pill device" designed to "sabotage a statute").
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Amendment; substantive due process protection for abortion; and First
Amendment limitation on campaign finance regulation.
In United States v. Georgia, the Court held that Title II of the ADA
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity to the extent that particular
claims raised in the case were based on conduct that violated the Constitution.11 3 It remanded for a determination, "on a claim-by-claim basis,"
of which aspects of the alleged conduct violated both Title II and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 4 In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthoodof Northern
New England, it declined to answer the first question on which certiorari
had been granted-that is, whether Salerno applied to challenges to abortion statutes-and instead held that if a statute regulating access to abortion would be unconstitutional in medical emergencies, it is "not always
necessary or justified" to invalidate the statute entirely because narrower
relief may be possible. 1 5 It remanded for a consideration of such narrower relief.1 16 And in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, the Court
held that its prior decision upholding the facial constitutionality of section
203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 20021 17 did not foreclose
a challenge to the constitutionality of applying that section to a particular
corporation's broadcast of a particular advertisement during the 2004
election."18 It remanded for the district court to consider the as-applied
challenge in the first instance. 1 19
For gamblers who are confident of their hand, raising the stakes is a
good idea, while for those less confident, it is not. Perhaps, then, these
decisions can be understood as lowering the stakes in a time of transition,
20
as the Court awaited confirmation of Justice O'Connor's successor.
That is, perhaps the Court was simply avoiding highly controversial matters during Justice O'Connor's "lame duck" term. So understood, they
say little about where the Court may be going now that Justice Alito is in
place.
113. United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 881-82 (2006).
114. Id. at 882. As to conduct that violated Title II but not the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court left the abrogation question to the lowers courts in the first instance. Id.
115. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S. Ct. 961, 964 (2006).
116. Id. at 969.
117. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 190 n.73, 204, 207-09 (2003)
(reviewing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.)).
118. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016, 1018 (2006).
119. Id.
120. Cf. Rick Pildes on Georgia,Ayotee and WRtl, http://www.scotusblog.com/movable
type/archives/2006/01/22-week/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (suggesting that the "Court's actions are being shaped right now by Justice O'Connor's unusual position of imminent retirement during the Term" and that the Court, while divided, is "bypassing those divisions
by agreeing unanimously to temporize and let the lower courts confront these issues again,
by which time the Court will presumably be stable again"); A Big Term for As-Applied
Challenges, http://www.scotusblog.comlmovabletype/archives/2006/01/22-week/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (suggesting that "there is at least one decided trend so far on the Roberts Court: A strong preference for as-applied challenges . . . at least until Justice
O'Connor's replacement is on the Court").
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Maybe so. But Ayotte announced, at least as a general matter, that a
court "confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute" should "try to limit
the solution to the problem."' 12 ' It added, "[w]e prefer, for example, to
enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving
other applications in force ...

or to sever its problematic portions while

leaving the remainder intact.' 2 2 Not only did Ayotte reiterate the "normal rule" favoring partial over facial invalidation, but it also acknowledged that the ability to devise a narrow remedy depends in part on the
"background constitutional rules at issue.' 2 3 Although this point was
phrased in terms of the clarity of the underlying constitutional rules affecting the availability of narrower relief, it opens the door to the further
acknowledgment that those rules might be shaped in order to facilitate
narrower relief. Moreover, it stated that the "touchstone" is legislative
intent-whether the legislature would have "preferred what is left of its
statute to no statute at all"-while expressing wariness of legislatures
that
24
would simply punt constitutional questions to the courts.
Most strikingly, the Court in Ayotte distinguished its facial invalidation
of Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute on the ground that "the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and we did not contemplate, relief more
finely drawn.' 25 It thus invited parties-and the Justices themselves-to
be more conscious of such possibilities.
These decisions, then, may be more than simply keeping the stakes low
as the buck is passed to a new set of players. Instead, they have the potential to stand as important markers on the road to a more modest judi26
ciary, led by a Chief Justice who describes himself as a "modest judge.'
An additional reason for hope is that a striking feature of Samuel Alito's
opinions as a circuit judge is their narrowness; indeed his most frequently
criticized opinions were far narrower than the critics typically acknowledged. For example, in United States v. Rybar, the defendant was charged
with both the transfer and the possession of machine guns but was convicted only of possession. 127 Judge Alito addressed only the power of

Congress under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the possession of
28
machine guns, saying nothing about the transfer of machine guns.' Sim121. Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 967.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 968 ("Our ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly we have already articulated the background constitutional rules at issue and how easily we can articulate the remedy.").
124. Id. ("All the while, we are wary of legislatures who would rely on our
intervention ....
").
125. Id. at 969 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
126. Confirmation Hearingson the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be ChiefJus-

tice of the United States, 109th Cong. 158 (2005) (noting that, while he resisted labels, "I
have told people, when pressed, that I prefer to be known as a modest judge").
127. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing the conditional
guilty plea).
128. Id. at 286 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant "pled guilty to two
counts of the indictment charging only possession, and thus the constitutionality of the
transfer provision is not before us here").
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ilarly, the Chittister case involved the self-care provisions of the
FMLA. 12 9 Judge Alito confined himself to the constitutionality of abrogating sovereign immunity in that context, not in the context of caring for
family members. 130 Moreover, while concluding in Doe v. Grady that a
warrant authorized the search of all those on the premises named in the
warrant, Judge Alito did not claim that warrants in general authorized
such searches, or that affidavits in support of warrants should generally
be treated as incorporated into the warrant, but rather that a particular
warrant that specifically incorporated the supporting affidavit as to finding probable cause should also be read to incorporate that affidavit as to
the authority to search)-31 Even his dissenting opinion in Casey concluded only that the Pennsylvania spousal notification provision was constitutional on its face, leaving open the possibility132 that it might be
unconstitutional as applied to certain circumstances.
To those who are eager to limit Congressional power and confident of
their hand, raising the stakes by facilitating facial challenges rather than
as-applied challenges under the Commerce Clause, Section Five, and the
Spending Clause may seem like a good bet, just as for those eager to
protect abortion rights and confident of their hand, raising the stakes by
facilitating facial challenges rather than as-applied challenges may seem
like a good bet. The same is true for those on the opposite side of these
issues. Indeed, ideological advocates of all stripes might think it in their
interests to raise the stakes-all the better to increase political salience,
133
mobilization, and even fund raising.
129. Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2000)
(describing the claim).
130. Id. at 228-29 (noting the absence of "any finding concerning the existence, much
less the prevalence, in public employment of personal sick leave practices that amounted to
intentional gender discrimination"); id. at 229 (concluding that the "FMLA provisions at
issue here do not represent a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment").
131. Doe v. Grady, 361 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the question whether occupants other than John Doe should be searched was closely tied
(if not identical) to the question whether there was probable cause to search such persons,
and the face of the warrant incorporated the affidavit with respect to the issue of probable
cause" and concluding that the "warrant did in fact authorize a search of all persons on the
premises").
132. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 721-23 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (evaluating the facial attack); id. at 721 n.1 ("Because the plaintiffs made a
facial attack ... proof that the provision would adversely affect an unknown number of
women with a particular combination of characteristics could not suffice."); id. at 723 n.6
("I cannot believe that a state statute may be held facially unconstitutional simply because
one expert testifies that in her opinion the provision would harm a completely unknown
number of women.").
133. Cf. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1187 (9th
Cir. 2006) (noting that in some cases, where
it is not possible to achieve the full legislative goal, the leaders of the battle
may prefer to drop the legislation entirely in order to be able to wage a more
dramatic and emotional campaign in the public arena. They may conclude
that leaving an issue completely unaddressed will make it easier for them to
achieve their ultimate goals than would a partial resolution that leaves their
"base" discontented and disillusioned. Dropping the proposed legislation (or
even having it defeated) may be the best way to gain adherents to the cause,
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But it is hard to see how the judiciary has any comparative competence
in gambling. And while it is possible, of course, that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will grow into less modest judges as they become
accustomed to their new roles, I remain hopeful that all will bear in mind
not only the comparative competence of courts, but also that when someone gambles big and loses, the loss is inevitably big.
III.

CONCLUSION

The central question in constitutional adjudication is the degree of deference, if any, the judiciary should show to the constitutional interpretation by others. In deciding when to defer and when not to defer, the
judiciary should focus on its comparative competence. A major way in
which the judiciary is comparatively competent is in its ability to unbundle legislation, to treat a single application of a single provision of a statute in a single case. The judiciary should fashion doctrine to take
advantage of this comparative competence rather than undermine it. In
particular, absent a reason rooted in a different comparative competence
it has, the judiciary should not succumb to the temptation to raise the
stakes of constitutional disputes, but rather fashion doctrine that facilitates as-applied rather than facial challenges. Finally, there is some (albeit modest) reason for hope that this may be the direction of a more
modest Roberts Court.

inspire the faithful, raise funds, and possibly even generate support for a constitutional amendment.).

